The Murmansk Riddle:
Inside Russia’s Military Build-Up on NATO’s Northern Flank
From satellite secrets to silent airfields — Russia is quietly transforming Murmansk into a strategic fortress on NATO’s doorstep.
Putin sees Murmansk as a key asset because it anchors Russia’s Arctic military presence while enabling large-scale energy and infrastructure expansion. Its strategic location near NATO borders makes it essential for both defense posturing and asserting control over the Northern Sea Route and Arctic resources.
Since February 2022, Putin made at least two publicly reported visits to the Murmansk region and in its recent one end of March he timely launched a new nuclear-powered submarine called “Perm” —equipped with hypersonic Zircon missiles, with the destructiv power so vast that even NATO recognised it.
In addition to Perm, Putin re-established the Leningrad Military District to include Murmansk as a response to NATO’s expansion.
More recently, Putin specifically approved a list of instructions aimed at bolstering the region’s infrastructure and energy capabilities. Key initiatives include the construction of the Volkhov–Murmansk gas pipeline by 2030 and decisions regarding the development of nuclear icebreakers by 2026 — a plan that is crucial for maintaining year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route, which is vital for both economic and military purposes.
Murmansk is undeniably central to Putin’s long-term Arctic doctrine, linking energy, military infrastructure, and great-power signaling in a zone bordering NATO.
According the Kremlin’s Telegram News channel, Putin has repeatedly met with Murmansk Governor Andrei Chibis to discuss socioeconomic development and has endorsed initiatives like the “Clean Arctic” project, which mobilizes volunteers to rehabilitate remote northern territories.
Do the people want that? The riddle here: Russians want both. A majority support Arctic development in a poll, with 86% favoring environmental protection and 68% backing Putin’s mining plans — revealing a contradictory yet broadly optimistic view driven more by ideals than informed understanding.
Putin also inaugurated and promoted massive infrastructure and LNG energy projects in the region — especially the Arctic LNG-2 project by NOVATEK — aimed at boosting Russia’s foothold in global energy markets. This is where Russia still earns its money, propping the defence industry. Hence an understandable endevour.
His visits and videoconferences have focused on master planning for Arctic settlements, housing renovations, even a “healthcare reform”, and support for families, veterans, and participants of the war in Ukraine, tying Murmansk’s development tightly to both domestic welfare narratives and geopolitical strategy in the Far North. Putin sees here the next frontier of trading and if needed, fighting.
Murmansk and the military: NEW military defences in 2025
One powerful way to monitor a vast region like Murmansk for signs of military fortification is through synthetic aperture radar (SAR) interference. Enter Bellingcat’s SAR interference-tracker.
This tool uses SAR satellite data to detect and visualize historical Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) on a map — typically caused by military radars — allowing users to pinpoint, analyze, and download radar activity over time by clicking on specific locations and interacting with time-aggregated graphs.
The image for May 2025 indicates the presence of strong, localized electromagnetic emissions, often linked to military radar systems. The fact that these stripes are repeating and sharply defined suggests rotating or pulsed radar installations, likely tied to air defense or missile warning systems. Where the lines meet, there is, among other stuff, the “Military commissariat of the Murmansk region Monchegorsk city”.
Notably, the interference only began in February 2025; there had been no such activity since the start of the war in February 2022, according to the agregated SAR interference records.
Bright circular areas (e.g., around Olenegorsk, Afrikanda, Apatity) are persistent RFI hotspots. Olenegorsk, in particular, is known for hosting Russian early-warning radar systems (such as the Daryal or Voronezh types). These facilities emit powerful signals, which show up clearly on SAR data as consistent interference.
Military bases
It’s worth breaking down the bases, its assets such as subs and planes to filter a signal for analysis, hidden just kilometers from Finland’s border — also with a bit of help from AI.
Murmansk has become a key region to watch, revealing how Russia is steadily building up troops and military infrastructure along the NATO frontier. Since February 2022, several military sites in the area have shown signs of upgrades.
To identify all known military installations across Murmansk Oblast along the finnish border— at least those recorded by OpenStreetMap, thanks to contributions from the open source community — we can write a quick OverpassTurbo query to map them and build a clearer picture of the region’s military footprint.
https://overpass-turbo.eu/: Go to Overpass Turbo. Paste the query above into the left-hand code panel. In the map window, zoom in manually to Murmansk Oblast (Northwest Russia — north of the Arctic Circle, close to Norway/Finland). Click “Run” (top left) to execute the query for that bounding box.
We can alter the query and only see the russian bases in Murmansks. Extract the results and alternatively run a query in your Terminal window to turn results into Excelsheet for analysis.
After downloading and importing the satellite data into Google Earth Pro, Monchegorsk Air Base stands out clearly on the Kola Peninsula. Since February 2022, Russia has accelerated upgrades to key military sites across Murmansk Oblast, strengthening its Arctic posture in response to NATO’s growing presence in the north.
Monchegorsk, one of the region’s most strategically important air bases, has seen notable developments. It hosts the 98th Guards Composite Aviation Regiment, equipped with Su-24M strike aircraft, Su-24MR reconnaissance jets, and MiG-31BM interceptors — critical assets for Russia’s Arctic air defense and rapid response capabilities.
According to the The Barents Observer the nearby settlement, “27 km,” housing military personnel, was designated a “courageous air force settlement” in 2025, reflecting its heightened role. Infrastructure improvements, including a new clinic and a renovated school, further suggest long-term investment in sustaining operations at the base.
Similarly, Olenya Air Base (68.1446, 33.4637) now hosts long-range bombers used in Ukraine, with satellite images confirming heightened aircraft activity.
Since 2022, Olenya Air Base on Russia’s Kola Peninsula has undergone significant militarization, transforming into a central hub for strategic aviation operations. Satellite imagery from 2024 and May 2025 reveals a heavily utilized tarmac, with a marked increase in stationed aircraft, including Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bombers, as well as updates to missile silos west of the runway.
Since 2022, Olenya Air Base on Russia’s Kola Peninsula has grown into a key strategic hub, with satellite images from August 2024 showing 39 Tu-22M3 bombers and 11 Tu-95MS bombers on-site — nearly all parking areas occupied. There was also a new white silo, hiding essential equipment, not meant to be spotted from space.
To counter Ukrainian drone strikes, Russia has placed up to 25 tires per wing on aircraft to disrupt image-based drone targeting and covered 13 rows of fuel tanks with protective mesh. Air defenses nearby include six S-300, S-400, or Buk-M3 launchers in ready position, supported by three electronic warfare antennas and a GPS jamming unit, underscoring the base’s elevated threat posture near NATO borders. From here, Russia flies nasty attack operations into Ukraine.
A GPS jamming system is also visible, and so is the air defence. These measures signal Moscow’s concern: the base, located just 150 kilometers from Finland and 200 kilometers from Norway, has become a high-value target as Ukrainian drone capabilities extend deep into Russian territory.
And Severomorsk (1-2–3). Once believed to have been permanently closed in 1998, Severomorsk-2 airbase on Russia’s Kola Peninsula is now firmly back on the radar. Its runway not far from Murmansk City, is visibly in disrepair, and is undergoing refurbishment under direct orders from the highest levels of Russia’s military command, with full modernization planned by 2030.
According to Northern Fleet commander Admiral Alexander Moiseyev, the base is part of a broader Arctic infrastructure overhaul, which includes the reconstruction of seven airstrips — among them Severomorsk-1, Severomorsk-2, and Severomorsk-3 — and the construction of two new airstrips at Nagurskoye and Temp, designed to accommodate all types of long-range, transport, and naval aviation, so the russian news agency TASS, from early June 2022.
These developments, paired with visible upgrades to other Arctic military facilities, reflect a clear intent by Moscow to re-militarize the High North and secure its logistics and deterrence posture amid growing NATO presence near its borders.
“We plan to build two airstrips and reconstruct seven, including Severomorsk-2, by 2030,” said Admiral Alexander Moiseyev, commander of Russia’s Northern Fleet, in 2022.
Many of these upgrades at the Murmansks Airstrip may therefore appear unrelated to Ukraine or Finland’s NATO membership — but in reality, they could offer the Kremlin added flexibility to obscure conflict-related military changes in Murmansk under the guise of long-term Arctic development.
The military analyst Emil Kastehelmi documented how Russia is quietly revitalizing its northern air infrastructure in Murmansk Oblast — home to five key airbases: Severomorsk-1, -2, -3, Monchegorsk, and Olenya. Severomorsk-2, reactivated in 2022 as a helicopter base, while Severomorsk-3 saw new protective fighter shelters built in 2024, likely in response to the rising Ukrainian drone threat.
At Olenya, strategic bombers like the Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 — used in long-range strikes against Ukraine — have been concentrated for added security, with at least one Ukrainian drone attack reportedly damaging a bomber in July 2024. Meanwhile, Severomorsk-1 has had fighter shelters repaired, and Monchegorsk remains unchanged.
A norwegian Olygarch in Murmansks that can help build airstrips
For Mumansk to flourish and to be valuable militarily it needs airbases. And who could build them better than companies from abroad.
Atle Berge is a Norwegian businessman who established a significant presence in Murmansk, Russia, through his company Ølen Betong Murmansk AS, a subsidiary of the Norwegian concrete firm Ølen Betong. He initiated operations in Murmansk in 2007, capitalizing on the region’s construction boom, particularly in infrastructure and energy sectors.
In 2016, Berge was expelled from Russia on vague accusations of espionage, allegedly for collecting information for Norwegian intelligence services. This expulsion barred him from entering Russia for ten years. However, in 2022, he returned to Murmansk after obtaining a new visa and work permit, resuming his role at the concrete production plant.
Upon his return, he reported securing contracts worth 500 million rubles (or 5.7 Million Euro) and mentioned working on a larger project, indicating ongoing involvement in substantial construction endeavors in the region.
There it is important what Berge’s firm really does. One key area are so called road slaps and more specifically, air field slaps. With Ølen Betong Murmansk precast concrete slabs, as advertised on the website (Link), he could become a important supplier to the military government in the region.
These slaps are indeed suitable for military-grade surfaces, and with proper engineering, they could be used to construct temporary airstrips or support areas in regions like Murmansk. This aligns with the kind of dual-use infrastructure often developed in militarized Arctic zones.
Murmansk Naval Bases
Russia’s region on the Kola Peninsula, has actually several major naval bases and acts more than ever as a linchpin of Putin’s 2025 naval power. The dense network of strategic locations for submarines and vessels underpin its military posture in the Arctic and against NATO’s northern flank.
Severomorsk (69.0769°N, 33.4178°E) serves as the headquarters of the Northern Fleet, coordinating surface and submarine operations across the Barents Sea. In Severomorsk, the russia’s Project 22350 amred frigate Admiral Gorshkov is also stationed.
Noticable, as in late 2024, the Admiral Gorshkov returned to Severomorsk after a historic 226-day deployment — the first by a Northern Fleet vessel armed with hypersonic missiles, including Zircon and Kalibr, across the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
Whether a vessel is in port or not can — though not always — be a telling indicator of heightened naval, and infact waring activity. In April 2022, shortly after the invasion began, OSINT analyst Thord Are Iversen (@The_Lookout_N) noted that the frigate Admiral Gorshkov had disappeared from Severomorsk.
Sentinel-2 imagery from April 19 confirmed it had departed sometime after the 15th, with a submarine now occupying its berth — previously documented on Google Earth in 2020. When comparing Planet satellite images of the naval base from February 22 and April 24, 2022, the shift is striking: multiple vessels, including Gorshkov, had deployed to sea, reflecting a rapid operational response.
It started out from here in November 2024, then visited Alexandria, the English channel, and entered with it a long term deployment in the mediteranien sea, highly explosive territory. Now in May 2025 (6. of May), the Admiral Gorshkov returned back to this strategic naval location, and its capitain received turkey (photo).
Though there is no public records that this vessel was involved in Ukraine. But in November 2024, it did conduct naval drills in the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel, and there simulated responses to both air and sea drone attacks, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Severomorsk itself does not house many submarines, but it is indispensable to Russia’s submarine operations in the Arctic, acting as the operational command center for the entire Northern Fleet — home to the country’s largest and most capable submarine arsenal.
A shot from 2020, a 151 m long, Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine, most likely from the Oscar-II class (Project 949A Antey) which are frequently operated out of Severomorsk or possibly an Akula-class (Project 971) — both of which are common in the Northern Fleet
In recent months, many of the vessels have returned to that location. Whether this signals a broader buildup of strategic assets remains unclear and would be premature to interpret.
At the Polyarny (69.1989°N, 33.4472°E), several war vessels have their port in Yekaterininskaya, Murmansk. It functions as a vital repair and maintenance hub, ensuring fleet readiness. The base and its shipyards is so important that in April 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Shipyard №10, located in Polyarny, due to its involvement in supporting Russia’s military activities, including the war against Ukraine. Right left to it war vessel base is the Polyarny submarine base.
Satellite images show that submarines occasionally appeared in port in 2021 and earlier. In 2023, @MT_Anderson identified several naval assets at the site, including four Kilo-class submarines (possibly one Lada-class), as well as various anti-submarine and mine countermeasure vessels.
Can we infer anything from the absence of submarines? Their absence at key bases in Murmansk, such as Polyarny or Gadzhiyevo, can signal heightened operational activity, including strategic patrols, dispersal to avoid detection or attack, or increased readiness in response to NATO movements or conflict developments.
While not definitive on its own, such absence — especially if observed across multiple sites — may reflect a broader shift in Russia’s naval posture. But should never be analyzed alone but alongside other indicators like support vessel movements, logistics buildup, and regional military exercises. We see subs stationed in various years since March 2022.
Olenya Bay (69.2050°N, 33.4470°E) supports special mission submarines under the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), reflecting Russia’s focus on undersea intelligence and sabotage operations.
Collectively, these naval installations for the norther fleet that fortify Russia’s strategic depth in the High North, enabling power projection, securing the Northern Sea Route, and serving as a counterbalance to NATO’s presence in the region — can be counted (thanks to spotting of OSINTers like MT Anderson).
Grand Total: 13 submarines spottable since 2022 on open source satellite images
Many of the submarines are either on a mission or are moored under some sort of structure. Because only a fraction are visible. As of early 2024, russian sources suggest that the entire Russia’s submarine Northern Fleet fields at least 36 submarines distributed across Zaozersk, Gadzhiyevo, Vidyaevo, Polyarny, and Olenya Guba, underscoring the Kola Peninsula’s continued role as the nuclear and covert nerve center of the Russian Navy.
At Gadzhiyevo Naval Base (69.26°N, 33.32°E), the presence of four Delta IV-class SSBNs, one Borei-class SSBN, and two Akula-class SSNs suggests a near-complete concentration of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, potentially during a maintenance or rearmament cycle. At Olenya Guba (69.21°N, 33.36°E), both Podmoskovye (BS-64) and Orenburg (BS-136) — modified Delta-class subs used for deep-sea and special operations — were docked, while the intelligence-gathering ship Yantar was notably absent, indicating potential deployment. Meanwhile, Polyarny Naval Base (69.20°N, 33.47°E) hosted four Kilo-class submarines (possibly including a Lada-class) alongside several mine warfare and anti-submarine vessels, underscoring its role in coastal defense and patrol.
On December 5, 2024, U.S. company Capella Space released a detailed SAR satellite image of Russia’s Gadzhiyevo naval base, clearly showing submarines like the K-157 Vepr and a 667BDRM-class SSBN — imagery made possible by radar tech capable of peering through clouds and darkness.
Gadzhiyevo’s assets forming a critical component of its nuclear deterrent. Its Naval Base (69.2552, 33.3373) shows ongoing construction and frequent deployments. Interestingly, in 2020, Vladimir Putin gave the Northern Fleet its own command — an unmistakable nod to its growing importance in the Arctic. But in a quiet shift in March 2024, that autonomy was scrapped. Now folded back into the Leningrad Military District, the move signals a strategic pivot: Moscow is centralizing control as it hardens its military posture along NATO’s northern edge.
More bases
Vidyaevo (69.3158°N, 33.2781°E) supports attack submarines, enhancing Russia’s undersea warfare capabilities. Zapadnaya Litsa (69.4811°N, 32.3511°E), located approximately 60 kilometers from Norway’s border, has seen increased activity with the deployment of advanced Yasen-M class submarines, such as the Arkhangelsk, bolstering Russia’s long-range strike potential.
Nearby Olenya Bay (69.2473, 33.3355) — a base for deep-sea intelligence submarines under the GUGI unit — has seen notable infrastructure growth.
Severomorsk-1 Air Base (69.0561, 33.4186), the main hub for naval aviation, has expanded both its aircraft fleet and facilities, while Severomorsk-2 (69.0636, 33.4743) is being reactivated for anti-submarine helicopter operations.
Monchegorsk Air Base (67.9081, 32.8329) plays a growing role in Arctic air patrols, with increased fighter and bomber movements observed.
Meanwhile, Kamenka Base (67.8748, 30.0905), close to the Finnish border, has expanded rapidly with new troop housing and visible deployments — all signaling a sharpened Russian military posture in the High North, as the New York Times reported.
LLM for Satellite observation
Lets have another look at Russia’s Olenya Air Base the Kremlin where Russia uses strategic bombers to carry out flights targeting Ukrainian positions, according to Ukrainian sources.
Large language models like ChatGPT claim to be increasingly capable of assisting with satellite image analysis, particularly in open-source investigations. I put it to the test and provided two clear satellite images of the same location — Russia’s Olenya Air Base — to compare structures, count visible aircraft or vehicles, detect land-use changes, and identify signs of military expansion or reactivation.
ChatGPT failed horribly. It counted 46 for the image in June 2021 and 116 for the one taken in August 2024. In reality, there were 34 plus 6 Helicopters were visible for 2021 and three years later 46 plus 6 helicopters — mostly so fighter jets. Not great — When I asked to pinpoint the changes and the planes on the original input images, it gave me completely wrong assessments. But the idea is there any image analysis is improving at vast speed.
Interpreting visual patterns with contextual military knowledge and open-source reporting hasn’t revealed clear signs of aggression — but it’s proven useful in identifying what’s worth watching. For example, noticing an uptick in strategic bombers like the Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 signals increased offensive potential. To investigate further, I asked how these aircraft appear in satellite imagery: the Tu-95MS stands out with its massive 50-meter wingspan, long straight wings, four turboprop engines casting spiky shadows, and a twin-fin tail forming a distinctive “plus” shape from above. In contrast, the Tu-22M3 is shorter (about 34 meters), with a sharp, needle-like nose and a single, prominent fin — easy to spot if you know what to look for.
So we can „fingerprint“ those planes. And indeed those planes were present on May 19, 2025, on the base (Xpost). According X account @avivector 5 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 5 An-12 (Cub) and 38 Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C)
All of these have different functions. There is Luostari Airfield in Murmansk Oblast, that has received minimal attention in 2025. Actually in 2019 believed to have been closed down for good, since 2022 satellite images showed signs of construction of a Rezonans-N radar station nearby, designed to detect stealth aircraft like the F-35. In 2022 still under construction on a hill near the site, latest Planet images suggest it could be finalized now.
Airspace violations for Murmansk
Airspace violations remain a critical indicator of regional tension. Several high-profile incidents have been recorded, including one on June 10, 2024, when four Russian military aircraft reportedly breached Finnish airspace near Loviisa, penetrating 2.5 kilometers into the country. Experts point to the proximity of Murmansk Oblast — home to multiple key Russian airbases — as a likely launch region for these aircraft.
But also Ukraine reaches for Murmansk, as its strategic importance is known. In 2024, Ukrainian drones reportedly struck Olenya Air Base in Russia’s Murmansk region — located roughly 1,800 km from the Ukrainian border — damaging at least two Tu-22M3 strategic bombers. Russian Telegram channels and flight tracking data indicated that Murmansk Airport was temporarily closed due to the drone threat, marking the deepest known Ukrainian UAV penetration into Russian territory to date. On September 11, 2024, Russian sources claimed that drones targeting Olenya Airfield in the Murmansk region may have approached from Norway and Arkhangelsk, though it could never have been verified.
Conclusion
The upgrades, the increased personal, attention, investment and also seemingly strategic changes in the military and business related assets visible here in the analysis for Murmansk, are not new. Already in 2017 did analysts and investigators notice upgrades, such as by DFRLab. “Not only did the fleet receive new S-400 Triumph SAM systems, but these systems are of high combat-readiness — having been sent straight from their previously deployment in Syria”, so Lukas Andriukaitis.
The latest push however — in after February 2022 but also particularly for Feb 2025, the results reflect worries for findinds from other parts of the finnish border.
Last week, satellite images published by The New York Times — and confirmed by NATO sources — revealed a sharp increase in Russian military infrastructure along the 1,300-kilometer border with Finland, including new troop camps, vehicle depots, and air facilities. Notably, over 130 tents capable of housing 2,000 soldiers have been set up in Kamenka, while the Severomorsk-2 airbase in the Arctic is being reactivated as part of the broader buildup.
