How Kalibr missiles could determine the outcome of the Ukraine war
Putin’s favorite cruise missiles have an uncertain future. It could save the lives of many civilians (BH)
How Ukraine and Western powers are using a mix of sanctions, air defense systems, and counterattacks to increasingly eliminate one of Putin’s most potent weapons — high-priced ballistic missiles — has not been a major topic in Western media.
However, it is obvious that defensive measures could save lives. Russian forces use high-precision missiles to destroy targets, even far behind the positions of their troops. This is also used for psychological warfare, because no one should feel safe from Russia’s long arm anymore.
Putin’s favorite weapons are the so-called Kalibr missiles — a group of Russian models consisting of indigenous variants, such as 3M54, 3M14K, and Kalibr-M, and export versions, the Club-S, Club-N, Club-T, or Club-A.
These missiles not only destroyed Ukrainian positions, but killed innocent civilians and children. Commanders and generals who give the order to launch them carry blood on their hands just like Russian soldiers who torture POWs and civilians.
Moreover, vast sums are wasted on their production — money that Russia could arguably use more urgently for a better health care system and to fight the pandemic. This and other analyses show how Putin’s power is increasingly diminished as their production becomes more complicated and uncertain. As missile defense systems become more accurate, these missiles are also becoming less influential, especially now in the Ukraine war. Thus, the future of the Kalibr missiles currently in use is increasingly uncertain (3M54, 3M14 and 91R). But new developments are leading to better and better Kalibr missile models. This gives experts new cause for concern.
The killing of civilians in Vinnytsia
On July 14, 2022, missiles of the type “Kalibr” cause a terrible scene in a peaceful Ukrainian city, far behind the lines hostile to Russia. In the middle of the central Ukrainian city of Vinnytsia, with its 370000 inhabitants and about 130 km north of Moldova, several missiles hit the city center. A bloodbath is the result.
First, four cruise missiles are launched at sea, namely somewhere in the Black Sea. Then two hit their target. Security cameras record the scene and make it possible to verify the time to the second. At first it seems like luck of the draw. Two Kalibr missiles are intercepted by Ukrainian air defenses. This is also confirmed by the government politician of Vinnytsias, Serhiy Borzov.
The Kalibr cruise missile used here was one of the most expensive missile models Russia can offer to its enemies. Russia spared no expense or effort. They were deployed en masse over Ukraine. As here in Vinnytsias, the explosions kill with apparent pinpoint accuracy. From the explosions and resulting fires, the two missiles kill at least 23 people. Among them, several children die. More than a hundred people are injured.
Coinciding with the impact, a meeting to discuss Russian war crimes is held in The Hague. The New York Times and other credible parties classify this missile strike as a war crime.
Why did so many innocent people have to die? Not only Ukrainian citizens are asking this question. The truth is that the headquarters of the Ukrainian Air Force is located in Vinnytsia. Thus, the city moves into the target radar of Russian troops. Right next to the place of the air strike there is a statue with a fighter plane. Ironically, no damage was done to it.
The Russian Defense Ministry boasts on their social media channels about the accuracy of these missiles. Yet, they don’t seem to be particularly accurate when it comes to civilian lives.
For as this and other cases in this analysis show, civilian casualties they hardly avoid. The question for many relatives and human rights abuses investigations: Did the missiles miss their target. So is the quality of the weapons to blame that many more people died? Or was there deliberate firing into crowds of civilians? Or is it a mixture of the two options?
On paper, the precision of the missile type — of which there are several models — is relatively high at 2 to 3 meters. Even smaller buildings, like the case of the missile attack on Ukrainian factory for tanks (as my colleagues and I were able to trace here), can probably be taken out without any problems even with a Kalibr missile.
Telegram account Rybar — who leads a shadow army of pro-Russian OSINT hackers — repeatedly offers the Russian military exact geo-coordinates of positions, train stations, power plants, and even civilians on social media. The extent to which the military has accepted this offer remains unclear.
“The traditional foul language of the disgruntled is attached,” the pro-Russian account Rybar taunts the victims of the attack.
Kalibr 3M 54 missiles are among Russia’s most advanced land-attack missiles. So why did these missile strikes have such devastating consequences for civilians if they are so “accurate”? The number of missiles fired certainly contributed to the destruction. The missiles that hit hit their target, which was a Soviet-era concert hall, the “House of Officers” at 37 Kotsyubyns’koho Ave.
There, according to the statement of the Russian army, a meeting of high-ranking officers, in the officers’ club of the army, would have taken place. A meeting of the Ukrainian Air Force Command with representatives of foreign arms suppliers: “…representatives of foreign arms suppliers who discussed the dispatch of another batch of aircraft and the use of Ukrainian aircraft. The attack led to the elimination of the conference topics.”
The missiles were fired from a ship. The Russian military loves to record launches of Kalibr missiles. A video shows a launch a day after the attack. This scene shows three missiles.
Why, according to the authorities, at least 23 people died as a result of the rocket attack certainly has something to do with the second rocket. Satellite images and post-impact recordings give an idea of where it struck, namely near offices and health facilities. These facilities can also be easily verified by Google Maps/Yandex Maps.
How unsuccessful or successful the Russian attack really was can be guessed from the identities of the dead. The Ukrainian authorities subsequently released only 14 names of the victims. This leaves the identity of the remaining (9) fatalities in the dark. According to research, at least three of the dead worked for the Ukrainian defense. Through open data from the network, they can be assigned in part.
The death of the Ukrainian Officer Kostyantyn Puzyrenko was posted on the website of Berdychiv Municipality announced. Uniform insignia indicate where he worked. In the case of Oleg Makarchuk announced his death online at his military academy. He died on the day of the impact, leaving two sons behind. The death but not the exact location of Colonel Dmytro Burdiko is mentioned on Instagram.
Killed, non-Ukrainian “representatives of foreign arms suppliers” as has been asserted by Russian sources, cannot be verified so far.
Even if there had been such a meeting between high-ranking officers — which could not be verified — the missiles caused many more casualties than could be expected from precision weapons. The fact that there was such severe destruction, especially of neighboring buildings, raises serious questions. To partly clarify these questions, computer simulations will help us later.
After the missile strike, a strike of FakeNews
Shortly after the impact, Russian state media reiterated that a strategic target had been taken out here. RT’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, citing the Russian Federation’s Defense Ministry, said the missile strike was aimed at the officers’ house, where “Nazis” were housed.
The Russians’ reports match other incidents that have been foiled or written with false facts, experts complain. RUSI expert Samuel Ramani speaks out on Twitter. Russia had shelled agricultural facilities in Odessa with their Kalibr missiles, but then claimed they were merely ammunition depots. Similarly, in August, when five Kalibr flew towards Ukraine (two of which were shot down). While no one was killed, three Kalibr hit agricultural targets.
Another question is: why did Russia use Kalibr missile worth several million USD to slaughter civilians? What also seems certain is. Had the two other missiles not been intercepted, there might have been many more casualties.
The impact of cruise missiles usually causes a crater of several meters. When a Kalibr missile hits a house, the destruction can be much greater, as this model simulation by a German design studio shows.
From the simulation we learn how powerful these missiles are to wipe out civilian targets. Half of the simulated block of houses will be demolished. But not only that. One can grind out how other buildings and people surrounding the target are additionally damaged in the wake of the blast. Thus, the term “surgical strike” — so fondly used in strategic warfare and in connection with these missiles — remains pure illusion. The example of Vinnytsia shows this, as does the Kalibr missile attack on Nikolaev at the end of March.
Doubts on their precision
More and more doubts are being raised about the precision of the missiles. Western experts say the Kremlin (via Russian median) deliberately overestimates their accuracy. According to British and American intelligence sources, Kalibr missiles in particular (and some other missile models) have a very low accuracy. What Russian media claim is simply an illusion. More than 60 percent of Russian cruise missiles miss targets, according to NATO statistics. The Kalibr missile is no exception. What this means for Vinnytsia is clear: Even if the military had wanted to hit it accurately without causing civilian damage, the risk of missing seems greater than hitting it. Transferred, that makes potentially every Kalibr attack a case for an investigation into human rights violations.
What exactly Kalibr missiles can do, however, cannot be determined without a precise description of the type — for example, 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missile — and information on payload. Payload determines the explosive power. For a Kalibr missile this can be up to 500kg of explosives. A huge payload.
A rough draft of the trajectory of the Kalibr missiles that flew to Vinnytsia can be traced. However, since the coordinates of the ship remain unknown, the launch site can only be guessed. However, the sighting of the missiles shortly before impact — in the city of Bershad — speaks in favor of this trajectory. The missiles have two guidance systems. The first is fully autonomous. The second is controlled by GLONASS and GPS. According to experts, the latter makes it possible to correct the trajectory during the flight. Whether a correction has taken place cannot be determined here.
A rough draft of the trajectory of the Kalibr missiles that flew to Vinnytsia can be traced. However, since the coordinates of the ship remain unknown, the launch site can only be guessed.
However, the sighting of the missiles shortly before impact — in the city of Bershad — speaks in favor of this trajectory. The missiles have two guidance systems. The first is fully autonomous. The second is controlled by GLONASS and GPS. According to experts, the latter makes it possible to correct the trajectory during the flight. Whether a correction has taken place cannot be determined here.
It probably took only a few minutes to fire the missiles and let them hit the people-filled city center, according to the analysis. Just a few minutes. That doesn’t give Ukrainian troops much time to react. Exactly how much time was left can be guessed from Kalibr training missions. Using the example of a Russian test run, a missile took only 137 seconds to reach a target 250km away (according to Zvezda TV with footage of the test firing). For the roughly 450km, that translates to about 247 seconds, just over 4 minutes.
Despite the horrors, a small victory
Despite the devastating consequences of the attack, Ukrainian air defenses were able to celebrate a small victory. Kalibr missiles were intercepted. One was later found and photographed. It was not the first time. These crashes make it possible to study the models in detail.
This is not the first time that expensive Kalibr missiles have been launched. In recent months, Ukrainian defenses have had more and more to counter precisely these missiles. Ukrainian troops have the S300 Air Defence System to thank for this.
In August, four missiles of the S300 system were sufficient to destroy four Russian caliber missiles. Thus, while the possibility still seems given for Putin to potentially hit “everyone and everything” in Ukraine. However, the risk of a successful strike has been reduced.
Then, in early August, Ukrainian troops destroyed up to seven Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles fired from the Caspian Sea region. The Ukrainian Air Force celebrated this with an air defense rate of 87.5%. Nevertheless, this leaves further opportunities for Russia should missiles slip through its defenses.
Change of strategy
Few months into the conflict, Ukraines Air defense seems to be working properly. Unfortunately, there is a catch. Its air defense calculus works less well when Kalibr missiles are not fired from Russian warships but from submarines. This is because knowing the position of the launch is vital, it turns out. This is why the Russian leadership changed its strategy at the end of April/beginning of May.
At the end of April, the Russian Black Sea Fleet conducts the first Kalibr launch from the submarine Kilo 636, at ground targets of the Ukrainian army (Russia has half a dozen of this class). All missiles hit their target. Without coordinates of a launch site, as with ships, air or land positions, it suddenly becomes complicated to intercept Kalibr missiles.
Ukraine is not the only country that wants to launch missiles. Russia is now also taking increased precautions to fend off possible Ukrainian missiles. In August, Ukrainian troops were able to destroy eight Russian fighter jets through a series of explosions at an air base in Crimea. Russia’s response can be traced to satellite imagery, according to the ImageSat International (ISI) team of experts. Satellite images confirmed how S300 systems are being withdrawn from Syria.
Identifying missiles
Comparison and identification of these objects that fell from the sky can also be done. On September 3, the Ukrainian Air Force released images of an intercepted missile with a burned fuselage. The missile, marked “3П-14,” matches the Russian-issued model of the 3M-14.
Crashed 3П-14 in March
While Kalibr missiles can be recovered, often the people who find them know little about how dangerous they still are, even after they have crashed.
Toxic gases can still escape even after the crash, experts add. Ukrainian troops themselves warn against recovering them on their own. As in the case of the Kalibr missile on May 23, it was no different. The police or military should always be contacted immediately, they warn. Nevertheless, pictures keep popping up on the net. It seems that “missile spotting” has become a new trend among the Ukrainian population.
Analysis of measurement images of the 3M54–1 Kalibr ( = 3M14 Biryuza)
Except for the type, unfortunately, little can be confirmed here by this crash. Another case, posted on the web several months ago and again in the Vinnytsa region, in a field, shows similar images. On the shell is spotted the word “Earth”. Bold with sharpie, inside, we find the inscription “3M14”. When the photo is taken, the rocket is still smoking.
From the first days of the invasion, it was clear that Russia would try to use these missiles to attack deep in the Ukrainian hinterland — all the way to the Polish border, for example, to intimidate the enemy and its allies NATO countries that supply personnel and equipment.
On March 13, 2022, the war was only a few weeks old. 24 kilometers from the Polish border, Ukraine was training some 1,000 volunteers from around the world to become soldiers. Several long-range missiles hit the site. Dozens of people died, hundreds were injured. According to eyewitnesses, the impacts could also be heard in Poland. Just a day earlier, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned, “Weapons convoys are a legitimate target.” The Kalibr missile bombardment near NATO’s external border was a clear warning to the international community: no one was safe from Russia’s missiles.
More missiles
Not only complex Kalibr missiles with crash landings are found and analyzed at crash sites. In early September, a Russian Kinzhal Missile rained down from the sky near Russia’s Stavropol region. The missile system, which NATO christened Killjoy, can also be equipped with nuclear warheads and is fired from an aircraft — like a MiG. From there, it can fly more than 2000km — potentially across Russia.
False claims
The Kremlin repeatedly extols the benefits of the Kalibr missile as an “asset”. It brags that the enemy can be harmed militarily, Russia retains power in this “special military operation”, and is able to keep the enemy in check despite heavy losses on the battlefield. But whether these missiles hit military targets at all, as the Russian leadership announces, experts doubt again and again. Samuel Ramani of RUSI, the attack on grain silos and agricultural facilities is a sign that Russia is still trying to weaponize food under the guise of attacking military targets.
(On July 23, one day after signing the grain export agreement with Russia, the regime fired a Kalbir missile at the port of Odessa. The grain silos are only a few meters from the point of impact of the missile.)
The longest arm of Russia
Typical Kalibr missiles (such as the 3M14 / 3M54K) can usually be recognized by their white color, dashes, round head and short arms. Usually, measurements such as length help determine the missiles on the ground. The 3M14K Kalibr for submarines measures 6.2m. The 3M54K (fired from ships) and 3M54T (from submarines) measure 8.22m and 8.9m respectively. They thus help identify the weapon systems on high-resolution satellite imagery.
Live footage can also be helpful. Security cameras show a Kalibr missile that was used to bombard a factory in Odessa at the end of March. The slender fuselage, the round head, it matches the Kalibr model that was seen elsewhere, namely during the attack in Kharkiv. At that time, the missile killed 10 people. However, a mere visual analysis is not free of errors, experts warn. Therefore, in order to verify a Kalibr missile flawlessly, further evidence should be brought on board.
The estimated flight range of the 3M54 is only about 600 km. That of the 3M-14/3M-14T Kalibr missile is an astonishing 1,500–2,500 km. In general, 600 km is enough to attack Ukraine far behind enemy lines, deep in the country’s interior.
Among cruise missiles with a turbofan engine, this range makes them competitive with other missiles in international comparison, as statistics from a report by Fabian Hoffmann of the European Leadership Network, shows.
When Kalibr missiles are fired, they are launched from the sea, from a submarine or a Russian warship. Based on the shape of the contrails, investigators could also identify 3M14 missiles, or at least rule them out. In late April, the Russian Defense Ministry posted a video of a submarine launch. The missile can then be fired from a depth of about 50 meters. The contrails remain in the air for some time, which is sometimes the only sign to geo-locate the submarine.
Condensation trails remaining in the air sometimes appear on satellite images. Planet Lab images from early May show the typical signs of a submarine launch in the westernmost part of Crimea (the swerve of the stripes results when the missile first rises vertically, then gains horizontal propulsion) — it seems to be only a few kilometers from the Crimean coast.
What does Ukraine need now to destroy these submarines or at least keep them at bay? A fascinating exchange among OSINT colleagues discussed this at the end of April when the first submarines deployed missiles. One user asked whether “a drone should not go on patrol? Even a relatively small “anti-tank bomb” could threaten a submarine,” said one user. It’s not that easy. Submarines spend most of their time underwater. You can’t hit them with just missiles or other ordnance, he said. To hunt them you need a torpedo platform. At the moment, however, Ukraine does not have such capabilities, according to one user.
The Washington Post team was able to verify one video with these characteristics in late March. A video shows the launch of no less than eight missiles of this type. They were fired from the Russian destroyer near Sevastopol to the north, towards the Ukrainian mainland.
Also relevant is their max altitude. It amounts to a maximum of only about one kilometer. Thus, they are quite visible from the ground even in the flight phase and are often filmed by eyewitnesses, which facilitates the reconstruction of open source intelligence investigators.
The noise of Kalibr rockets is unmistakable. This can be seen on many videos. But how do experts and systems. When it comes to seconds, such a missile must be identified. Often this can be done with radar. Here Kalibr missiles leave their own fingerprint.
The shape and form, the behavior of these narrow, quite fast flying objects, all this results in its own profile of radar data. Looking purely at the data, as the Twitter account @Flankerchan did (and in Excel, he told me), these factors can help in making a determination. Flankerchan summarized this in a data visualization. He notices in particular: small UAVs and cruise missiles diverge strikingly from large fighter aircraft. This has to do with the lower RCS value (radar cross-section) (see graph). In general, a larger RCS value indicates that an object is easier to detect. The value of Kalibr is relatively low, thus more difficult to detect, and potentially a factor why Ukrainian defenses still struggle to intercept Kalibr missiles.
In clear weather, from the ground, Kalibr rockets are quite easy to spot. Even if they are still stuck on the ground. Like in the port of Sevastopol, on April 15, where photos of Kalibr missiles were taken. Satellite images then show them being reloaded onto Russian submarines. The submarines would later also be used to launch the missiles, after the Russian Defense Ministry posted the video.
There is also the issue of logistics. How are these missiles transported to the submarines? Often on special trucks, as the pictures above show. Often one truck is empty and another one is loaded, as the satellite pictures show. These trucks, especially long, with 10 wheels, are a striking detail on satellite images. From time to time they are also shipped in standard containers, as an archive image of a containerized Club-K missile weapon system shows.
However, at least with regard to the Ukraine war, most of the pictures were taken at ports. Often they show up during the transfer to ships or submarines. That a false analysis can arise, shows the example of the thread of the OSINT Twitter account OSINT88. The person behind the account claims to see Kalibr and missile tubes next to merchant ships (next to the red ship). But did the account measure correctly? Kalibr missiles measure around 9 meters. The mystery is solved as several weighty OSINT profiles take up the case. @obretix and @CovertShores clear it up. OSINT88 misidentified tanker trucks as missile tubes.
A second case, in August, analyzes satellite images of a Russian warship, taken at the port of Sevastopol. Again, we see the conspicuously long trucks. The context is also correct. This may be the loading of 3M14 (6.2–9.8m) or a 3M54T Kalibr cruise missile (8.9m).
Flight direction
While the estimated flight range of the 3M54 is only about 600 km, that of the 3M-14/3M-14T is estimated to be much farther, about 1,500–2,500 km. In general, 600 km is sufficient to attack Ukraine far behind the front line. Kiev is only about 400–500 km away from the Black Sea sea area. Why the city center of Kiev has been largely spared (except for a few exceptions) from Kalibr missiles until today is unclear. It might have to do with the Ukrainian Anti-Missile System (or to avoid escalation). However, these and other theories remain pure speculation for the time being.
Now Russia running out of missiles?
Correct. That could well be the case. The stock of Russian precision missiles has dropped sharply, Ukrainian circles say. At least that is the assumption of Ukrainian experts. Vadym Skibitskyi from the intelligence service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense said that Russia does not have many of its 3M14 Kalibr missiles left.
Which missiles Russia will fire at Ukraine at the end of September — i.e. not Kalibr missiles — raises questions among some analysts. For some, this is a signal that Kalibr stocks are low. For example, there are increasing reports of S-300 missiles being used against ballistic targets. This suggests that the Russians may soon have exhausted their stockpile of Kalibr and Iskander missiles, due in part to the sanctions, a USAF veteran said on Twitter. The use of a combat drone to terrorize civilians in Odesa (instead of Iskander, Kalibr, Kh-101, Kh-59) also shows that Russia has few precision munitions available, another user said.
For some war observers it is no surprise that Russian Kalibr missiles stocks appear empty. Again and again, videos and pictures from Ukraine, shared shared on Twitter, illustrate how “wastefully” Russian troops used Kalibr missiles. One missile landed in the middle of a field. The commenter on the post wrote: It is the most expensive hole in the world…
…Making probable the most expensive hole in the world — it cost $5 million.
Crater verification
A Kalibr air strike on a railroad station in Ukraine measures a deep hole, the video on social media shows. Calculations allow to guess the diameter, of about 12 meters. Accurate to the centimeter, it surely is not. But its enough to draw a picture.
Other than the impact with damaged on the tracks, nothing else seems to be damaged. The railroad line is located on a strategically important route. It could supply Ukraine with armaments. That makes it strategically interesting. Whether the attack really made sense for the Russians in the end is not clear.
Craters alone are not very useful for determining missile types beyond doubt (this is easier with missile parts that may be recovered). However, the pure dimensions of a bare ground impact, i.e. length and width, can be used to exclude certain types, such as a Kalibr cruise missile.
In the case of the September 19 missile impact near the Southern Ukraine nuclear power plant, according to President Volodymyr Selenskyj, a Russian missile struck Kiev. Above we already saw what a Kalibr missile can do. A crater of such a missile is usually at least 4 to 12 meters wide/long. According to official data (and own calculations — the shadows of people suggest this) this crater is only up to 4 meters wide — possibly too small for an impact of a 3M-14.
Increasingly substantive are analyses that Russia has fewer missiles at its disposal than before the war. In July, Ukraine’s defense minister stated that Russia may have lost as much as 60% of its missile inventory since the start of Russia’s war of aggression.
How the ministry arrived at this conclusion is not entirely clear. One option: comparing missile inventories with verified impacts. Another option involves counting export components. The Kalibr series of the developer Novator, according to a Ukrainian weapons expert, includes about 70% foreign components in the seeker head and other related elements of the guidance system. That’s about where the missiles produced can be categorized.
Ukrainian military expert Oleg Zhdanov adds that for the production of pure projectiles explosives are needed. Russia can usually do that itself. This requires metallurgy, which casts steel and produces blanks that must then be machined and fitted with the appropriate elements. Detonators can contain imported components. Russia can produce everything else itself.
For missiles, however, the world looks different. “All Russian Federation missiles contain imported components,” he said. If there were no loophole to circumvent sanctions, Russian defense companies would have to stop production of the Kalibr series. Quickly, therefore, there would be no replenishment. Even in the prewar period, Russia was only able to produce up to one Kalibr missile per month, Zhdanov adds. Components would have to be imported. Therefore, nowadays the production of Kalibr has practically stopped, the expert thinks.
Another clue is provided by statistics of Kalibr attacks. They have decreased massively. While expensive Kalibr cruise missiles, along with Iskander-M SRBMs, were used more extensively in the early stages of the conflict, U.S. intelligence reports say that Moscow has recently scaled back extensive use.
Experts explain that Kalibr missiles particularly shine in the context of strategic warfare, against civilian facilities in cities. The missile is well suited to hitting “hard” targets, such as a city hall or large buildings, according to former U.S. Army analyst Henry Schlottman. By comparison, the Iskandar missile is better suited for combat.
The price of the Kalibr missiles is substantial. Schlottman calculates the retail price at about $5 million to $6 million, based on documents showing export prices. This makes the Kalibr more expensive than other types of missiles, such as the Iskander. But most of all, it is more expensive than the smaller missile types, such as Tochka. But the latter, he says, are also much less accurate and thus more devastating.
Schlottman says that large parts of Mariupol and other Ukrainian cities have been so destroyed only because the cheap inaccurate missile types, like the Tochka series, have been given free rein. Amnesty International, meanwhile, confirmed with research by the AI Crisis Lab that the Tochka U missiles are extremely inaccurate. They would regularly miss their targets by half a kilometer or more. As a result, missiles would land in playgrounds and streets, causing mostly civilian casualties.
One Tochka U missile, crashed at a strategically unimportant target (Ukraine): An OTR-21 Tochka landed on a roof of an apartment building in Mariupol on March 1. (found): According to data, it has a maximum range of only a few hundred Kilometers (less than 200km).
Such effects are less likely with Kalibr rockets, he said. They are simply too precious, Schlottman said. Recently, the far more important strategic use of Kalibr has been seen. Ukrainian electricity plants have been attacked en masse and in some cases put out of action. Thus, they are again causing great damage, especially to the civilian population.
On September 11, just in time for the anniversary of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, Kalibr-Curise missiles fly from the Black Sea at targets in Ukraine. Missile attack on TEC-5 thermal power plant in Kharkiv by Ukrainian authorities is confirmed.
A meme crawling around social media, makes commentators predict a freezing cold winter for the Ukrainian population. It suits the Russian leadership well. It wants to force civilians to their knees, to break the resistance.
Problems with Kalibr missiles
While it seems that Kalibr missile is among Russia’s most popular instruments in this war, the missiles have some crucial drawbacks, says an expert.
One of them is their production. To produce Kalibr missiles, extensive and complex electronics are required. Russia suffers from supply problems and expertise shortages here in particular. To obtain the parts that go into Kalibr production anyway, it requires Russian shell companies in other countries.
Under false identity, they procure the electronics and supply parts covertly, and then deliver them to Russian defense companies. However, the fact that more and more Western companies are taking a close look at who is buying the components thwarts Russia’s game. Current sanctions should now take effect.
Error rate
Many of the calibr missile strikes claimed by Russia on social media are difficult or impossible to verify. Russia often claims that the strikes were successful. Often they are not.
The propaganda tactic makes sense. It is easier for Russia to claim that missiles are successfully deployed than to admit that they were intercepted or only hit Ukrainian decoys in each case.
According to a report in the Washington Post, information has been leaked. They show how Russia allegedly wasted at least ten Kalibr cruise missiles on mock Ukrainian positions.
According to British and American intelligence, the advanced long-range missiles would be in limited supply. Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby announced that he expected Russia to fire their precision-guided missiles fairly quickly (source).
We count several dozen of precision attacks in the official Russian channels of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The number of targets they claimed to have fired at have slightly decreased in recent months. This supports also an analysis of Kalibr mentions in Telegram chats.
Of course, this does not mean that Russian statements are to be blindly trusted. It is just another open source of data and should be taken with a grain of salt.
How large is Russias stockpile?
Schlottman estimates that Russia has a maximum of 500 Kalibr missiles. In late April, Forbes Ukraine estimated the total cost of Russian missiles fired at Ukraine at $7.5 billion. With each launch, Russia’s sunk cost balance (irreversible costs) also increases. Psychologically, this could drive Russian leaders deeper and deeper into a long-term war. After all, the capital investment is supposed to be worth it.
How many Kalibr missiles have been fired can also be determined more and more easily with open data. For example, pictures of Russian ships show how many Kalibr missiles have been fired.
Russian warships that have fired the missile types from the Black Sea at Ukrainian targets put red star-shaped stickers on their ship’s sides. Telegram account KCHV_RU found them and counted them.
Kchf_ru has more to offer. The account posts pictures of more Russian warships, some suggesting missile launch platforms for Kalibr missiles (https://t.me/s/kchf_ru).
Russian ships firing Kalibr missiles
Further indications of how many Kalibr missiles are “on site” (i.e. stationed in the Black Sea) are provided by information from the Ukrainian Naval Forces. In a Telegram message, the Ukrainian Navy, gives the status on 13.07.2022: “In combat operations in the Black Sea, the enemy maintains four carriers of operational-tactical missiles “caliber” with a total salvo of 24 missiles, in the Mediterranean Sea up to 3 carriers of operational-tactical missiles “caliber” and up to 2 missile cruisers.”
The occupier continued to control sea communications with 6 ships and boats in the Sea of Azov. A day earlier, on July 12, it was announced that Russian forces had deployed seven warships, each armed with seven Kalibr cruise missiles, in the Black Sea. That makes 49 Kalibr missiles. With a deployment like that, it’s not hard to see a pattern. Russia will keep firing, right down to the last missile.
How do these ships and missiles get to the Black Sea site in the first place? One means, they say, is for ships to surreptitiously cheat their way through the entrance. The Ukrainian Navy stresses that Russia is thus violating the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of the Sea (SOLAS). The tracking signal, also called automatic identification system (AIS), is deactivated on civilian ships in the Sea of Azov, it said.
The location of the ships can nevertheless be determined, even without AIS. Again, it is partly open data that gives clues to this. Satellite data and intelligence reports contain this information. Currently (as of Aug/Sept 2022), only two Russian Kalibr cruise missile carriers are in combat operations in the Black Sea, he said.
It is not that Russian ships with Kalibr missiles are completely unknown. There is a ruse. For example, Turkey has had the passage of the 135-meter frigate Admiral Kasatonov (project 22350) of the Russian Northern Fleet into the Black Sea blocked. It is helping to attack Ukraine. This is to be prevented, they say. The frigate is still deployed, along with other Russian naval units in the Mediterranean.
That was the status in May. in the September sources report that the location shifted. A former officer of the Belgian Navy wrote on Twitter in mid-September that the destroyer Admiral Tributs and the frigate Admiral Kasatonov were not in the port of Tartus during the last observations. “It is possible that both ships were operating in the Ionian Sea to monitor the operations of US aircraft carriers.”
Some ships come into question in this way. On August 23, a missile is launched from the “Mytishchi”. A granite cruise missile is fired from the “Pyotr Velikye” while sailing in the Barents Sea,. “Admiral Levchenko”, the amphibious assault ship “Aleksandr Otrakovsky” or icebreaker patrol vessels (as reported by TASS agency) are also repeatedly discussed in the context of Kalibr launches. They and others could possibly come into question soon — should they enter the Black Sea.
Attack of the Ukrainian armed forces on the Russian ship Moskva in April — also armed with missiles, but not Kalibr missiles — has provided the starting signal for a bitter naval war. Then, in April, Andriy Klymenko, director of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, revealed key information about Russian ships. Ten ships, with Kalibr missiles, are said to have been in the Black Sea at the time.
The Admiral Essen (first entry on the list), were sent from Syria to Sevastopol in 2018. In Syria, together with the Admiral Grigorovich, it allegedly fought ISIS there.
The team of the human rights group Truth Hounds noticed the ship. Using open source intelligence, the team was able to confirm that the Admiral Essen was responsible for the Russian missile attack on the Nikolaev Regional State Administration building on March 29 at 8:35. At that time, a missile hit the facade of the building and caused significant damage.
Why is this ship so important? The Admiral Essen’s missile strike on March 29 killed 37 people. According to information from Open Source Intelligence, two commanders were stationed on ship at that time.
The 2nd rank captain, Alexander Smirnov and Lieutenant Captain Anatoly Peretyatko, who controls the ship’s missile and artillery warhead (Data and Report, translation). They were said to be to blame for the carnage. They should now have to answer for it, they demand. In April, the ship was bombed by the Ukrainian armed forces.
3D Modell of the impact
Analysis from expert outfit Truth Hounds, a team of seasoned human rights experts, that traced war crimes and crimes against humanity related to armed conflict, the impact of a Kalibr 3M-14E.
Open sources also provide evidence that the missile was launched from the Black Sea. The coordinates that the team analyzed match those of the Admiral Essen.
Testimony from eyewitnesses further confirmed the presence of the missile. On the morning of the attack, eyewitnesses reported hearing a missile flying over the village, near Ivanivka (Ochakiv district, on the coast of Dnipro Bay). The sound of a Kalibr missile is unmistakable (so unmistakable that birds try to imitate these sounds).
The second ship on the expert Klymenko’s list — the Admiral Makarov — was fired upon in early May. A video shows her in flames. The burning ship can be verified reasonably well.
We also know more and more about the soldiers and commanders who work in the submarines and are on the ground. These submarines load Kalibr missiles, as well as fire them. The OSINT Telegram account Osintbees (along with InformNapalm) has posted a list of submarine commanders and sailors. Some of the names can be verified.
Among the submarines mentioned here — such as “Rostov-on-Don” (launch of a cruise missile in April, on Ukraine, her 2nd captain in the picture). , “Stary Oskol” (here 2016), “Novorossiysk”, “Krasnodar”, “Kolpino”, “Veliky Novgorod” and “Veliky Novgorod” — have Kalibr missiles loaded, some of which they have already aimed at Ukraine.
According to information from the newspaper Radio Svoboda, in May the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, i.e. all seagoing submarines capable of firing Kalibr, was sent out to the Black Sea.
Satellite images show: The ports where the submarines regularly dock in the southern bay of Sevastopol (Crimea) were completely empty on the afternoon of May 13.
Quality of the rockets: It is overrated
Another problem is the quality of the missiles. It is overrated, Experts like Schlottman claim. For the price in production and the strategic value placed on them, the Kalibr series has a conspicuous number of operational problems, Schlottman says. He says he has personally witnessed Russian Kalibr missiles misfire. That was a problem back then, before the Ukraine war, in Syria, he says. The ex-US Army analyst himself was stationed there.
At that time, Russia relied a lot on these missiles, just as it does today. In one day, on November 20, 2015, Russian troops fired no less than 18 3M14T cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea at targets in Raqqa, Idlib and Aleppo. A bloodbath was the result.
What Schlottman reports on Kalibr missile failure can also be found in part in the Ukraine war. A video posted in July by Russian Telegram users shows an unsuccessful launch of a Kalibr cruise missile from the Russian Admiral Grigorovich-class naval frigate (Twitter).
Where are these rockets made? Who builds them and why might there be delivery problems? There are relatively good answers to these questions.
Already there are indications that production has ramped up at plants where Kalibr missiles are supposedly made.
One expert wrote on Twitter that the Russian armed forces have conspicuously low stocks. Their Kalibr missile stocks are not yet bare, however. But the work has shifted and production has been “mobilized. Now there would be triple shifts at key defense companies producing these types of missiles. The UEC-Saturn company apparently plays a special role.
In April, journalists announced that in the city of Rybinsk, in the Yaroslavl region, at a UEC-Saturn plant, engines for Kalibr missiles are manufactured. That alone remains difficult to verify. Commentators on social media write that it is very surprising that this very plant is now looking for up to 500 new workers. “So production is probably running at full speed,” said one Twitter user. Job search ads can be verified.
Components from abroad
The production of Kalibr missiles is and remains complex, the selling price for export to other countries, also confirms this. The 3M-54 Kalibr is also known as 3M54–1 Kalibr, 3M14 Biryuza (Бирюза, turquoise) (NATO reporting name SS-N-27 Sizzler and SS-N-30A), 91R1 and 91RT2 is a family of Russian cruise missiles developed by Novator Design Bureau (OKB-8).
Part of the missile type is the turbofan engine series, turbojet bypass engine. Parts of such an engine were also found in a field in Belarus in early April, after a crash.
The supply chains here are particularly in the crosshairs of the Western sanctioners. The analysis shows little doubt that Kalibr missile production is heavily dependent on foreign partners.
But how to sanction? Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles, some of which were aimed at the Ukrainian capital Kiev, were found to contain 31 foreign components. At least, that is the assessment of experts from the RUSI organization (reporting by VoaNews). Among them is the radio altimeter, which is equipped with Altera computer chips. Reuters has done extensive research on the chips separately.
Components that have been sanctioned include individual parts that are not allowed to be exported to Russia in this way, especially if they are intended for military use. However, some parts had been manufactured and supplied long before the sanctions, for example parts exported as early as the early 1980s.
It would be different for parts of the Kalibr missile, which is manufactured with foreign components. Parts in 2018 and 2019 production can be traced. The case solidifies the theory that Russia, probably in the last decade with shadow/front companies — and after the annexation of Crimea — blithely continued to buy components. Still at least four years after Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, in 2014. That also provides insight into where sanctions oversight failed. Kalibr components, may no longer be obtainable from abroad.
Still unsanctioned
Even worse, the factories producing Kalibr missiles (and those which produce Tornado MLRS, Grad, Smerch, and Strela-10 air defense systems) are still not subject to sanctions. This was reported by the analyst group Trap Aggressor and StateWatch.org. They published the names of the companies at the end of September. Particularly in the crosshairs of analysts and relevant for the Kalibr Rocket manufacturing is the JSC Research Design Bureau “Novator” (in Russian: Опытное конструкторское бюро “Новатор” им. Люльева Л. В.), the orginal developer of the Kalibr missile class.
Its director and Head of Design as seems, Farid Khabibullovich Abdrakhmanov (Rus: АБДРАХМАНОВ ФАРИД ХАБИБУЛЛОВИЧ) can be found on sanctions lists of countries, but the sanctions are not yet “applied”, according to data from Sanctions. nazk.gov.ua.
The manager, born in 1954 in Zelenodolsk, has done plenty for Mother Russia, at least it seems so on the Russian Internet. He was awarded medals and science awards — like this one as a laureate to the Government of the Russian Federation in the field of science and technology. Abdrakhmanov is not only a passionate scientist. His passion lies in the development of advanced weapons systems, as he titles himself in one Russian science study published by Almaz-Antey (the company’s own science journal) along with colleagues. Also his colleagues could become interesting sometime for Western sanctions creators.
There is for example Beketova Anna Igorevna, a chemical engineer of the 2nd category, also at “NOVATOR”. Her research interests are in the field of development of new composite materials and technologies. This is certainly is relevant to the manufacture of modern weapons. Or Koitov Stanislav Anatolyevich, a doctor of technical sciences also at Novotor.
There is Dmitry Nikolaevich Kozhevnikov, doctor of chemistry, professor, and deputy general director, vice president for research and innovation, closed joint stock company for research and production “VMP”, or Leiman Dmitry Vladimirovich or Melnikov Vladimir Nikolaevich, both employed at Novotor. And that is only a handful of people in the company with nearly 2000 members of staff. The work by Abdrakhmanov and colleagues shows how closely Russian science is intertwined in the defense sector.
Why is Novator still not sanctioned? It is on the list in the USA to which it is not allowed to export. However, this is not sufficient. In 2017, the US Department of Commerce JSC OKB blacklisted Novator and the Federal Research and Production Center Titanium Barricades. At that time, Novator’s press spokesman still said that “ we believe that the introduction of such sanctions is an expression of unfair competition on the part of the US military-industrial complex.”
At that time it did not change anything in the production (also of Kalibr missiles). Five years later, some experts agree. Without the complex foreign electronic components that go into building the missile, Russia cannot possibly continue to produce Kalibr missiles.
In April, Russian defense contractor Almaz-Antey, which is also the parent company of Novator, said through TASS agency that it was now working on an “improved version” of the Kalibr: it should feature better performance and higher combat efficiency, according to the company’s CEO, Jan Novikov/Yan Novikov. The weapons produced by Almaz-Antey are in use in the Russian army and in more than 50 other countries, the state-owned corporation said.
While the corporation itself has been sanctioned in some countries, Novikov and other members of the management (see also picture) still face direct sanctions. Thus, the company’s General Director Alexander Vasilievich SHLYAKHTENKO (Александр Васильевич ШЛЯХТЕНКО, TIN 7810537558) is also spared sanctions (except in Ukraine).
What we also find here in the Sanctions.nazk data also matches the research of the Reuters media agency. A significant number of top executives of Russian defense companies remain unsanctioned. Nearly three dozen executives of Russian arms companies and at least 14 defense contractors were not covered by sanctions by the United States, the European Union or the United Kingdom.
With regard to the submarines now sailing in the Black Sea, it should be added that the Russian Ministry of Defense also concluded large contracts with shipyards. Thus, the company Admiralty Shipyards (which significantly helped in the production of submarines of the Black Sea Fleet of the project 636.3) was called “a stable supplier of weapons for the Navy”, by the then Deputy Defense Minister in 2017, Yuri Borisov. The company was sanctioned by the United States but omitted by Australia and the United Kingdom.
Summary:
In February 2022, shortly before the Russian war of aggression, the defense think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) predicted that Russia could defeat NATO on its borders. The Russian missile systems located in Crimea would be sufficient to defeat NATO’s European forces as far away as Spain (in green, here the SS-N-30/3M-54 Kalibr with nuclear warhead).
This analysis, however, finds that the power of Russia’s Kalibr missiles is waning. After months of Kalibr fire on Ukraine, their limits and limitations are better known. Certainly, Russia could also target NATO countries, but it would face a very different diplomatic and military counteroffensive.
As we have seen, Kalibr missiles are quite easy to identify and track. They still remain one of the most influential weapons systems Russia used against Ukraine and Ukrainian civilians.
How long this will continue, however, is uncertain. The missiles are expensive, are often “wasted” on strategically-unimportant targets, and are still produced with foreign components. The faster and more effectively the foreign suppliers can be eliminated, the sooner Russia will have to stop missile production. This could save the lives of many.
Contrary to all expectations that such an expensive and strategically acclaimed weapon should deliver, Kalibr missiles are relatively accurate, but suffer from quality defects. False starts or other problems sometimes cause one or the other to fall out of the sky.
The Ukrainian army also seems to be better and better equipped to intercept them. This drives Russia to deploy more. Per attack, more and more cruise missiles are now being fired simultaneously. Over time, this becomes more and more expensive and at some point no longer sustainable.
In the tragic case of Vinnytsia, the interception was partially successful. But the remaining missiles still caused a bloodbath among civilians. The fact that so many civilians died probably has to do with Russia’s generals and Putin’s ruthlessness. They simply didn’t care if civilians died or not. All that mattered was the mission. The analysis confirms that terrible war crimes are being committed with Kalibr missiles.
The Russians’ next threat could come from so-called Burevestnik missiles. Putin praised this new generation as one of the “6 super weapons” he had developed. Thus, he said, the Burevestnik missile, with its fabulous range, offers Western powers with a nuclear response.
There are also indications that Russia is now testing this nuclear-powered missile. Research with satellite imagery shows that the Pankovo test site (on Novaya Zemlya in the Russian Arctic) is reportedly showing increased activity.
It is not only in Ukraine that there are concerns that Russian Kalibr missiles could cause damage. Intelligence agencies and the U.S. military trembled as two submarines (one Russian and one Chinese) carrying warships entered the U.S. economic zone in the Kiska Islands in Alaska. Of the six warships, three carried Kalibr missiles with nuclear warheads. It was the first time since World War II that a battle formation of ships had come so close to U.S. soil.
How the war with rockets inspires art:
